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The Applicability of the Sherman Act
to Legal Practice and Other
"Non-commercial" Activities
Two recently filed antitrust class actions raise, for the first time, the
question of the Sherman Act's applicability to the legal profession. An
action filed against local and state bar associations in Virginia alleges
that the associations have restrained competition in the market for legal
services by fixing the minimum fees that may be charged by practicing
attorneys.' Another action, filed against the publisher of the Martin-
dale-Hubbell Law Directory,2 alleges that the Directory permits estab-
lished attorneys to suppress potential competitors by basing its ratings
on their solicited evaluations of their competitors' competence.3
The threshold question in these suits will be jurisdictional-whether
the Sherman Act applies to the practice of law. In the past, some courts
have exempted activities from the Sherman Act because they were (I)
not "trade or commerce" or (2) "traditionally non-commercial." If the
courts find that the practice of law comes within either limitation, the
question of jurisdiction will turn on the validity of the limitations
themselves. And because these limitations may be interpreted broadly
to include the learned professions, higher education, amateur athletics,
and a wide range of other activities, disposition of the threshold juris-
dictional issue in the Martindale-Hub bell and Virginia State Bar suits
may well determine the Sherman Act's applicability to many important
sectors of the economy.
Courts have justified these limitations by reference to legislative
1. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, Civil Action No. 75-72-A (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 20,
1972).
2. Steingold v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., Civil Action No. 72-1460 (N.D. Cal., filed
Aug. 11, 1972). The Directory is a "law list" which the complaint describes as follows:
Law lists are compilations of the names and biographical data concerning lawyers
and related services needed by lawyers. Usually e lists arc organized grouping
lawyers [sic] by the geographical area in which they practice. The utility of
these lists is to enable anyone seeking to engage the services of a lawyer to have
a ready source of information regarding the names and addresses of available
lawyers and an indication of their competence.
Complaint at 3.
3. Id. at 5. The complaint avers that the Directory
is a self-perpetuating trust, an athletic supporter for banks, insurance companies.
mortgage companies, railroads, and lawyers friendly to them. . . . The Directory
is a plan, trust, scheme, and design to stifle competition and lower the standards
of the Bar by recommending and keeping "forwarded" cases within the hands of
a small, silk-stocking-knicker-bocker-split-fee-club of inept commercial lawyers.
Id.
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intent.4 They have never provided any evidence of intent, however,
and a reexamination of the legislative history and language of the Act
shows that no such evidence exists. On the contrary, Congress clearly
intended to strike broadly at certain economic evils and to reach those
evils wherever they might appear. Limitations that exempt activities
categorized as "traditionally non-commercial" or not "trade or com-
merce" seriously undermine this policy. Additional institutional con-
siderations, such as the need for predictable, principled adjudication,
also militate against preserving the limitations. Wherever the potential
for those economic evils is shown, therefore, the courts should take
jurisdiction, regardless of the activity concerned. And, in the practices
at issue in these two suits, the potential can clearly be shown.
I. Support for the;Limitations
Although the two limitations overlap somewhat, they are not co-
extensive and they have separate origins. In content, they reach simi-
lar 5 groups of activities; however, these groups are not necessarily iden-
4. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1971);
United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 28 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D.D.C. 1943).
5. Among the activities apparently excluded by the "trade or commerce" limitation
are the "learned professions" such as law and medicine.
The Supreme Court has never specifically held that the learned professions fall within
this limitation, but this conclusion has long been inferred from the language of several
cases. In FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643 (1931), the Supreme Court said:
Of course, medical practitioners, by some of whom the danger of using the remedy
without competent advice was exposed, are not in competition with respondent.
They follow a profession and not a trade, and are not engaged in the business of
making or vending remedies but in prescribing them.
283 U.S. at 653.
In United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950), the Su-
preme Court found the Sherman Act applicable to the activities of real estate brokers
after distinguishing their activity from what it called "professions." In Riggal v. Washing.
ton County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), the court stated: "The practice
of his profession [medicine] as disclosed by the allegations of his complaint is neither
trade nor commerce within Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act .... " Id. at 268.
See also United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D. Utah 1962).
See generally Coleman, The Learned Professions, 33 ABA ANTrrMusT L.J. 48 (1967).
However, on several occasions the lower courts have adopted definitions of "trade
or commerce" which would include the "learned professions." The Court of Appeals
in United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 709-10 (D.C. Cir. 1910), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1939) (for an explanation of the case's history see note 115 infra),
did not define the term so as to distinguish between a profession and any other busi-
ness. The District Court in Marjorie Webster, 302 F. Supp. 459, 465 (D.D.C. 1969), took
the same approach. But the reasoning of these opinions has not been scrttinIzed by
the Supreme Court. In American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (19-13),
the Supreme Court approved the application of the Act to the activity there In issue
but on grounds which neither approved nor rejected an exemption for the "learned
professions." In Marjorie Webster, the Court of Appeals reversed but on grounds
which did not impugn the District Court's definition of "trade or commerce," 432
F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 400 U.S. 965 (1971).
Among the activities to which the "traditionally non.commercial" limitation applies
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tical.G In method of application, the first requires that the activity al-
legedly restrained be trade or commerce for the Sherman Act to apply
For example, in Martindale-Hubbell the issue will be whether the al-
legedly injured attorney's activity, rather than Martindale-Hubbell's,
is trade or commerce. The second limitation, excluding from the Act's
coverage "traditionally non-commercial" activities,8 nonetheless per-
mits the Act to apply when it is shown that the defendant had a
"specific intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects"" of the
are those related to "the liberal arts and the learned professions." Marjorie Webster,
432 F.2d 650, 654. It is not yet clear how close a relationship is necessary to cause
activities related to education or the professions to be outside the purliew of the
Act. The District Court in Marjorie Webster, in denying an exemption to education
related activities like accreditation, emphasized the number of diverse activities whidt
are now education related, stating, "Many institutions rent dormitory rooms and operate
dining halls, book stores and other service facilities." 302 F. Supp. at 465. By tailing
to distinguish these activities, the Court of Appeals, which sired the "traditionally non-
commercial" limitation, implied that they too might fall beyond the reach of the Act,
at least where conducted with non-commercial motives. Thus, quite possibly the ex-
emption extends beyond the traditional aspects of education itself to include a host
of other activities conducted in the supposedly non-commercial environs of the campus,
such as research undertakings, college athletics, and the numerous on-campus services
provided by the college or university. But ef. United States v. Wisconsin Alumni Re-
search Foundation, 1946 Trade Cas. 58,035 (N.D. Ill. 1946) . applying the Act to on-
campus research endeavors.
6. The court in Marjorie Webster implied that the limitations did not apply to
exactly the same activities. 432 F.2d at 653.
7. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943).
8. The descriptive accuracy of referring to the Marjorie Webster limitation as ex-
empting activities due to their "traditionally non-commercial" character rather than as
a result of the absence of commercial purpose may legitimately be questioned. Although
the opinion speaks in terms of both the character of the activity and intent, the
character of the activity appears to be paramount because only if the character of
the activity is such as to remove it from the Act does intent become an issue. The
court stated:
Of course, when a given activity falls within the scope of the Sherman Act, a
lack of predatory intent is not conclusive on the question of its legality. But the
proscriptions of the Sherman Act were "tailored . . . for the business world,"
not for the non-commercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned profes-
sions. In these contexts, an incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or pur-
pose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to war-
rant application of the antitrust laws. 432 F.2d at 654 (footnotes omitted).
9. Marjorie Webster, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (emphasis added.) Marjorie Webster did not
precisely describe the intent showing required of plaintiffs who attempt to apply the
Act to "traditionally non-commercial" activities, but the strict nature of that showing
can be inferred from the facts and language in the case. The court based its conclu-
sion that the requisite intent was not present on what it treated as a conclusive finding
of fact by the trial court. The District Court did not find that the Association's ac-
tivity was not motivated, at least in part, by a desire to preserve the fiscal well-being
of the member institutions. The District Court's finding was merely that there ims
no "evil, purposeful plotting," 302 F. Supp. at 466.
A further ramification of this strict intent requirement can be seei in a case
where the defendant has both commercial and non-commercial motivation. Such a
case is exemplified by the facts in United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y,
343 U.S. 326 (1952), where the motivation behind the medical societ)'s practices
under attack was "both monetary and ethical." Id. at 328-29. The Mariorie Webster
court implied that as long as there is a non-commercial purpose, even if accompanied
by commercial purpose, the Act would not be applied. The court stated:
It is possible to conceive of restrictions on eligibility for accreditation that could
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activity.10 However, in view of the likely difficulties in proving such
"specific intent," this requirement may well lead to the wholesale ex-
emption of "traditionally non-commercial" activities.
The origin of the requirement that an activity be "trade or com-
merce" is a negative inference drawn from the affirmative language
of the Act." Since the Act expressly applies to "trade or commerce,"'1 -
any activity not "trade or commerce," so the inference goes, falls out-
side the Act. Several cases-beginning in 1922 with Federal Baseball
Club v. National League' 3-appear to support that inference. In Federal
Baseball, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Sherman Act to pro-
fessional baseball because that sport was not "trade or commerce." 14
The Court also referred to the practice of law, saying, "a firm of law-
yers sending out a member to argue a case, or the Chautauqua lecture
bureau sending out lecturers, does not engage in such commerce be-
cause the lawyer or lecturer goes to another State."'1 The Court in
reconsidering baseball's antitrust exemption, which now seems to have
an idiosyncratic life of its own apart from the "trade or commerce"
have little other than a commercial motive; and as such, antitrust policy would
presumably be applicable.
432 F.2d at 654-55.
The "traditionally non-commercial" limitation, in marked contrast to the main stream
of antitrust, appears to emphasize the defendants' motivation to tile point of ex-
cluding consideration of the commercial effects. In Marjorie Webster, the allegedly In.
jured party was a junior college that was conducted for profit. The profit-making
junior college, in seeking recognition by the defendant accrediting association, had an
apparently commercial purpose, a desire to increase profits. The member schools of
the defendant association, though not technically profit-making organizations, reaped
competitive advantages from the exclusion of Marjorie Webster from membership.
Behavior in the protected areas, though imbued with commercial effect, Is none.
theless exempt if attributable to a non-commercial purpose.
10. In his article on the application of the antitrust laws to certain types of re-
straints, Coons concluded that non-commercial purpose was relevant. But the diffl.
culties of proving such purpose did not exist in the restraints he chose to discuss,
such as Negroes' refusal to patronize segregated transportation facilities or church
members' agreement not to attend certain movies. See Coons, Non-Commercial Pur.
pose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962). "In the hypothetical situa.
tions posed, the restraining activity is undertaken by persons not in competition In the
market affected-indeed, not in business at all." Id. at 708. Coons' analysis Is not aimed
at the "businessman" defendant at all. Within the category of "businessmen," Coons in.
cludes both doctors, id. at 727 n.64, and lawyers, id. at 753-14. Although Marjorie Webster
does not refer to this article, it may well have influenced the courts approach. On the
possibility of commercial motives successfully masquerading as non-commercial ones see
Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-Commercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970
DUKE L.J. 247, 280-81.
11. See Coleman, supra note 6, at 48. See also Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions
from Antitrust, 19 ABA ANTnUsTR SEc. 313, 353 (1961), AMtERICAN BAR FOUNDATiON, RE-
SEARCH MEMORANDUM SERIES No. 12, MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULES AND THE ANTITRUST LAws:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 3 (September 1958).
12. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) §§ 1, 2, and 3.
13. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
14. See pp. 318-20 infra.
15. 259 U.S. at 209.
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limitation,16 has read Federal Baseball as saying that Congress never
intended to bring baseball within the Sherman Act.1' On the basis of
such presumed congressional intent, other decisions imply that "learned
professions" fall outside the Act because they too are not "trade or com-
merce."'.8 This year in Flood v. Kuhn the Court noted that Federal
Baseball "has also been cited, not unfavorably, with respect to the
practice of law."' 9
The second limitation has a more recent origin, although it too rests
on the assumption that Congress did not intend the Act to apply uni-
versally. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia created it
in 1970 in Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of
Colleges and Secondary SchooLs,20 where a proprietary junior college
sued an accrediting association made up of competing schools for un-
justifiably refusing to grant accreditation. The fi-rst limitation was
inapposite because the activity allegedly restrained, the operation of a
junior college for profit, was "trade or commerce," even though the
defendant accrediting association's activity might not have been char-
acterized as such.21 Thus, the court fashioned another limitation, rely-
16. The baseball exemption now relies primarily on (1) stare decisis and (2) con-
gressional intent inferred from congressional inaction. See Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), Flood v. Kuhn. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
17. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 US. 356, 357 (1953), Flood v. Kuhn.
407 U.S. 258, 284"85 (1972).
18. See the opinion of the District Court in United States v. American Medical
Ass'n, 28 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1939), rev'd, 110 F.2d 703 (1940), cert. deied, 310 U.S.
644 (1939), which relied on a reference by the Supreme Court in Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc., v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932). to a statement made by Justice
Story construing The Coasting and Fisheries Act of 1793, c.8, 1 Stat. 305, 316, in The
Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507 (No. 10,388) (C.C.D. Me. 1834):
Wherever any occupation, employment or business is carried on for the purpose
of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned
professions, it is constantly called a trade.
The District Court concluded that the Supreme Court's reference to the words "not
in the liberal arts or in the learned professions," amounted to an "authoritative state-
ment of the Supreme Court that the professions were not 'trade' and therefore not
within the intent of the Act." United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703,
709 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court. and the
Supreme Court eventually decided the case on other grounds. American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). However, the Supreme Court apparently ac-
cepted the "trade or commerce" limitation as a premise. Although the Court avoided
the question of "whether a physician's practice of his profession constitutes trade under
Section 3 of the Sherman Act," id. at 528, the Court's deferral of that question pre-
supposed the inapplicability of the Act were it to be answered in the negative. Other
opinions which treat "trade or commerce" as a prerequisite for application of the
Sherman Act are United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 226 (1954); United States v,
International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 251-53 (1955) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Minton), and Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413, 414 (6th Cir, 1953), a1'd sub noa.
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). See also United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1930), where the Court, while
refusing to decide whether professions were exempt, referred approvingly to Justice
Story's definition of "trade." But see note 51 infra.
19. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 271 (1972).
20. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
21. See 302 F. Supp. 459, 466 (1969).
317
The Yale Law Journal
ing heavily on a Supreme Court opinion stating that the Sherman Act
"is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and
is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations . ..which
normally have other objectives. ' '22 Concluding that the Act was
" 'tailored ... for the business world,' not for the non-commercial
aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions, ' 23 the court
held the college accrediting association to be exempt from the Act.
II. Federal Baseball Reexamined
Federal Baseball, the main pillar of the "trade or commerce" limi-
tation,24 has been misread. Although Federal Baseball has been recog-
nized as dealing, at least on one level, with the limited federal power
underlying the Act, 25 the case is generally read as holding that Con-
gress intended the Act to apply only to "trade or commerce."2 0 The
apparent source of the intent reading is language in Federal Baseball
saying that baseball,
although made for money would not be called trade or commerce
in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by de-
fendants, personal effort, not related to production, is not a sub-
ject of commerce. 27
The Court, by using the phrase "trade or commerce," referred only
to the jurisdictional test for federal power under the Commerce Clause,
which the Act couches in terms of "trade or commerce among the
several States. ' 28 Under old Commerce Clause cases, the Court had to
22. 432 F.2d at 654. The Court was quoting Klor's, Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1957), where the Supreme Court bricfly summarized Its
opinion in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
23. 432 F.2d at 654, quoting Eastern R.R." Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961).
24. Pater'nity is generally attributed to Federal Baseball. See, e.g., Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); United States v. American Medical Ass'n,
110 F.2d 703, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1943). See also Pogue, supra note 11, at 353; AtERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 4.
25. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON STUDY OF MONOPOLY 1'OWEK OF 'ilIE
HousE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1952):
Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE L.J. 236, 241 (1959).
26. See, e.g., United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S.
236, 251 (1954) (opinion of Justice Minton dissenting on other issues); Salerno v. American
League, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970) (opinion of Judge Friendly), cert. denied, '100
U.S. 1001 (1971). State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990
(1966); REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMrEEr ON STUDY OF MONOPOLY POWER OF 'rilE HOUSE Cost.
MITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 134 (1952).
27. 259 U.S. at 209 (1922).
28. See note 41 infra. The dissenters, Justices Burton and Reed, in Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), perceived that Federal Baseball was a case
818
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decide for constitutional purposes whether the subject matter being
regulated was "commerce" as well as whether it was "among the sev-
eral States."2 9 In both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
the case turned on Commerce Clause precedents. Nowhere in their
opinions did those courts imply that the phrase "trade or commerce"
restricted the Act in any way other than by reference to the federal
power involved. The issue was not whether Congress had chosen to
exempt baseball from the Act; it was whether Congress lacked the
power to include baseball within the Act.30 Thus, Federal Baseball
dealing only with the existence of interstate commerce as a requisite for federal power.
However, the dissenting opinion did not attack the majority's reading of Federal Baseball
because they did not seem to understand that the majority was attributing to Federal
Baseball the enunciation of limits on the scope of the Act apart from the interstate com-
merce requirement. The dissenting opinion stated,
Whatever may have been the situation when the Federal Baseball Club case was
decided in 1922, I am not able to join today's decision which, in effect, announces
that organized baseball, in 1953, still is not engaged in interstate trade or commerce.
Id. at 357 (1953). Thus, the dissent read the majority to be basing its per curiam affirm-
ance upon lack of interstate commerce, as it read Federal Baseball to be doing. For an-
other commentator who also read Federal Baseball as dealing only with federal power. see
Eppel, Professional Sports, 33 ABA AxTrrMusr L.J. 69, 70 (1967). See also Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 407-09 (2d Cir. 1949), where, without explicitly sa)ing so, Judges
Learned Hand and Frank appear to be reading Federal Baseball as a case dealing only
with the interstate commerce requirement.
29. These dual requisites for applicability of the Commerce Clause are illustrated by
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), the principal case upon which the Court in
Federal Baseball relied. Hooper held that the Commerce Clause did not prevent a state
from prescribing the conditions on which a foreign insurance company may do busi-
ness in that state because "[t]he business of insurance is not commerce." id. at 655, but
is merely incidental thereto. Propounding the same distinction, the Court in Federal
Baseball held that the Commerce Clause did not apply to professional baseball despite
the interstate travel involved because the activity itself, playing baseball, was not com-
merce. "That which in its consummation is not commerce does not become commerce
among the States because the transportation that we have mentioned takes place."
259 U.S. at 209.
The analysis in Federal Baseball may strike modern readers as relating to an autono-
mous statutory requirement because later cases have eroded this stringent Commerce
Clause requirement that the subject matter be "commerce." See Mandeville Island Farms.
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 231-34 (1948); Kallis, supra note 25.
According to the Supreme Court in Mandeville Farms, the transition from this old
analysis "was neither smooth nor immediately complete, particularly for applying the
Sherman Act. The old ideas persisted in specific applications as late as the 19S0's. 334
U.S. at 233. The transition having begun in 1911, see id., Federal Baseball's reliance
on an 1895 Commerce Clause precedent is illustrative of that persistence. In this regard.
Kallis refers to Federal Baseball as a "throw back," supra note 25, at 241.
30. Discussing authorities on the issue before the court, the Court of Appeals said:
In the American Baseball Club Case the precise queslion we are considering was
passed upon in a carefully prepared opinion, and it was held that the production
of exhibitions of baseball did not constitute trade or comnerce.
269 F. 681, 686 (1920) (emphasis supplied). The case to which the Court of Appeals re-
ferred, American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. Rep. 441 (1914), was concerned
only with the reach of the federal commerce power. Justice Bissell of the New York
Supreme Court said:
I cannot agree to the proposition that the business of baseball for profit is inter-
state trade or commerce, and therefore subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 459. After discussing the defendant's business of professional baseball, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the defendant is "not engaged in interstate commerce." 269 F. at
686.
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held only that in 1922 the Commerce Clause failed to cover baseball.
And Federal Baseball's example with respect to lawyers going out of
state meant only that in 1922 the commerce power did not reach activi-
ties which were not "commerce" despite incidental interstate travel.
Nothing in Federal Baseball warrants the conclusion that the case
recognized a separate jurisdictional requirement.31
Soon afterwards, in an opinion often overlooked by supporters of
the limitations, the Supreme Court itself interpreted Federal Baseball
as dealing solely with federal power. In Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v.
United States,32 decided in 1932, the Court considered a claim that
the phrase "trade or commerce" in Section 3 of the Act should be lim-
ited by Federal Baseball's construction of the same phrase in Sections 1
and 2. But the section of the Act at issue in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers,
Section 3, represents an exercise not of the commerce power but of
Congress' plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia. 3
Since the limits of the commerce power in no way restrict the power
of Congress under Section 3, the Court rejected the in pari materia
argument, distinguishing Federal Baseball's restrictions as dealing with
power limits and not congressional intent behind the Sherman Act.
Despite Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, the Court has treated Federal
Baseball as based on congressional intent.34 The Court did so this year
when it reaffirmed the baseball exemption in Flood v. Kuhn.3
5 Curi-
ously and most significantly, however, the Court on those occasions
has never provided any specific evidence of legislative intent-an
omission that undercuts the credibility of the legislative intent read-
ing of Federal Baseball.
31. It is interesting to note the ramifications of the realization that Federal Baseball
dealt only with the limits of federal power for the new grounds underlying the baseball
exemption: (1) congressional intent as inferred from congressional inaction and (2)
stare decisis. First, because Federal Baseball held that Congress did not have the power
to reach baseball, only congressional inaction after Toolson in 1953 can be read as
approval of the exemption. It is difficult to read congressional inaction in the years
between Federal Baseball and Toolson, as signifying more than a recognition of the
inadequacy of the commerce power to reach baseball. However, because Toolson int-
plied that Congress did have the power to reach baseball, inaction after 1953 can
be read as approval. In view of the number of proposals that have been presented
to Congress since 1953, there is still a strong case for congressional approval. See
note 110 infra. Second, Toolson's reliance on stare decisis is undercut because stare decisis
on the principle that baseball is not interstate commerce and therefore not subject to
the Act is in direct opposition to South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, holding that the
insurance business was not protected from the application of the Sherman Act despite
numerous cases holding that insurance was not within the reach of the commerce power.
See p. 323. However, by the time the issue reappeared this year in Flood, a strong argtt,
ment for stare decisis was possible on the basis of Toolson which rested the inapplicability
of the Act on grounds other than lack of interstate commerce.
32. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
33. As conferred by Art. 1, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution.
34. See, e.g., Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
35. 407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972).
320
Vol. 82: 313, 1972
The Sherman Act and "Non-commercial" Activities
III. Legislative Intent
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Sherman Act30 contains
no reference to applicability of the Act to those areas likely to be
exempt under the "trade or commerce" limitation, such as law, medi-
cine, and other "learned professions." But the debates do show that
Congress37 used the language "trade or commerce" for a specific rea-
son unrelated to intending an autonomous restriction on the Act's
reach. The phrase was merely a convenient drafting device for incorpo-
rating the common law doctrine of "restraint of trade" without exceed-
ing the constitutional power upon which the Act was predicated. 38
The relevant language from the Act is:
Section 1 ... in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States....
Section 2... any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States ....
Section 3 ... in restraint of trade or commerce .... 30
The draftsmen unquestionably used the term "restraint of trade" to
define the conduct made illegal by reference to the common law doc-
36. The Sherman Act has traditionally been interpreted by resort to its legislatihe
history. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). It must be remembered, however, that
legislative history should be used with certain reservations. The words of individual
Congressmen can never be represented as necessarily conveying the policy behind the
Act. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318-19 (1897). See
also F. MCCAFFREY, STATUToRY CONsrucroN 75-76 (1953); 2 J. SUTHERAND., STAtrrS
AND STATUTORY COSTRUCrONS, at 499-502 (3d ed. 1943). On the other hand, "statements
of individual legislators as to the evils requiring legislative attention" are generally
valuable in proving "that the legislature intended to remedy the evils described." 2
SUTHER AND, supra, at 502. See also McCAFFREY, supra, at 76; Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 212 U.S. at 50. With the Sherman Act, distortion is minimal, beause there ap-
pears to have been a general consensus as to the evils that inspired the Act. In 1890,
the trust problem was not a partisan issue (see 0. KNAtrri, TnE POLicy OF 'rite UNrED
STATFs TowARDs INDUsTRiAL MONOPOLY 17-19 (1914); Letwin, Congress and the Sherman
Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REy. 221, 247-48 (1956)), and there does not appear
to have been major conflict over the values behind the Act. See H. TioR.W, Tim FEDERL
ANrrnusr POLICY 227 (1955). In Apex Hosiery, the Supreme Court stated:
The unanimity with which foes and supporters of the bill spoke of its aims as
the protection of free competition, permit use of the debates in interpreting the
purpose of the Act.
310 U.S. at 495 n.15. See also KNAUTH, supra, at 18.
37. The form in which the statute was finally enacted in 1890 was not the creation
of Senator Sherman but of the Judiciary Committee. Unfortunately, most of the debate
on the Act occurred before the Judiciary Committee introduced its version of the bill.
Thus, there was little discussion by the legislators after the drafting of the Act as wc
know it. However, prior debates referring to the language later incorporated into the
Act offer strong inference as to the purpose intended by the use of that language.
38. In Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2nd Cir. 1949), the Court stated:
The field covered was "restraint of trade" which had a well known meaning at com-
mon law and the words "or commerce between the several states" were added to put
the restraints prohibited within the constitutional limitations on Congressional
power.
Id. at 406. See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 494.95 (1940).
39. 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
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trine of that name.40 They used the term "commerce among the several
States" to invoke the language of the Commerce Clause and thereby
avoid possible constitutional objections to the Act. 41
The term "trade or commerce" in Section 1 simply coupled the
separate phrases "restraint of trade" and "commerce among the sev-
eral States" by equating the terms "trade" and "commerce." 42 Through-
out the Act, Congress referred to "restraint of trade or commerce" and
"trade or commerce among the several States" rather than "restraint
of trade" and "commerce among the several States" in order to main-
tain the equivalency of meaning necessary to join these phrases in
Section 1. Thus, Congress joined the two concepts-"restraint of trade"
and "commerce among the several States"-without intending to set
up a new independent concept called "trade or commerce." Insensitive
to their separability, courts have fused together the last word of one
with the first word of the other to form a hybrid unforeseen and un-
intended by Congress.
Congress' desire to link the Act to the Commerce Clause raises the
argument that such a drafting device forever froze the Act to conform
40. The Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery stated that, "the phrase 'restraint of trade'
which . . . had a well understood meaning at common law, was made the means of
defining the activities prohibited." 310 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1949). See Tlior.tLL, sUpra note
36, at 222 n.151. When Senator Hoar presented the Judiciary Committee's proposed
version of the bill, which became the Sherman Act, he stated: "We have affirmed the
old doctrine of the common law in regard to all interstate and international commercial
transactions .... " 21 CONG. REC. 3146 (1890). See also, e.g., the remarks of Senator Slier.
man, id. at 2457, 2461; Senator Hoar, id. at 3152; and Senator Edmunds, id. at 3151-52.
41. See THORELLi, supra note 36, at 222 n.151. Senator Edmunds, who is generally
regarded as the principal author of the final version of the Act (see Letter from Albert
H. Walker to the Editor in CEN. L.J. 257-59 (1911); LETWIN, supra note 36, at 254.55),
proposed to the Judiciary Committee "that it is competent for Congress to pass laws
preventing and punishing contracts, etc. in restraint of commerce between these states."
The Committee members unanimously agreed. SENATE, COMMiTTEE OF TIE JUDICIARY,
MINUTE BOOK 226 (March 31, 1890). Senator George, who had originally suggested that
the bill be referred to the Judiciary Committee because of possible constitutional In-
firmities, said before the Senate:
The bill has been very ingeniously and properly drawn to cover every case which
comes within what is called the commercial power of Congress.
21 CONG. REc. 3147 (1890). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
42. See ToRELLi, supra note 36, at 222. Discussing the use of this terminology
Thorelli concludes:
The substantive matter of Section 1 is a restraint of trade or commerce. It has
sometimes been claimed that "trade" or "commerce" mean widely different things.
According to dictionaries published around 1890, however, it would seem that these
terms for most practical purposes can be regarded as synonymous.
Id. at 222. Construing "trade or commerce" for different reasons, Putnam, J., in United
States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893), stated:
So in this statute I think the words "trade or commerce" mean substantially the
same thing. But the use of the word "trade" nevertheless is significant. In my judg.
ment, it was probably used because it was a part of the common law expression,
"in restraint of trade .... "
Id. at 640. The same conclusion was reached by Atlantic Cleanerg & Dyers v, United States,
286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932).
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to the Commerce Clause as applied in 1890, far short of its reach today.
But this intent argument, if ever invoked on behalf of the "trade or
commerce" limitation, would lead to a very different limitation than
the one espoused by courts so far. In defining "trade or commerce,"
courts have generally looked to factors other than the scope of the
Commerce Clause in 1890. Moreover, the Supreme Court has answered
this argument by allowing the Sherman Act to grow with tie Com-
merce Clause.43 In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,"
decided in 1944, the defendants argued that the 51st Congress, which
passed the Sherman Act, intended it to apply only to those activities
considered interstate commerce under an 1890 construction of the
Commerce Clause. At stake in South-Eastern Underwriters was anti-
trust liability for price-fixing in the insurance business, which since
1869 the Court had repeatedly held not to be interstate commerce.
45
Nevertheless, the Court in South-Eastern Underwriters explicitly held
that the 51st Congress intended the Sherman Act's scope to expand
as the Commerce Clause received an increasingly broad construction. 0
The weight of available evidence of congressional intent buttresses the
Court's holding.47 If the Court had limited the Sherman Act to the
1890 scope of the Commerce Clause-that is, to interstate transportation
and "contracts to buy, sell or exchange goods to be transported" across
state line 4 8-it in effect would have gutted the Act 4' and overruled
numerous Sherman Act precedents.
43. See Searles, Trade or Commerce Among the Several States or with Foreign Na.
tions, in AN ANTrrusr HANDBOOK 141 (Sec. of Antitrust Law ABA ed. 1958).
44. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
45. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168 (1869); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S.
648 (1895); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
46. 322 U.S. at 556-59.
47. Evidence from the legislative history can be offered in support of either an in-
tention to freeze the Act at what was interstate commerce in 1890 (see evidence offered
by dissent, id. at 574-75) or an intention that the Act should expand with broadening
notions of interstate commerce (see evidence offered by majority, id. at 557-61). However,
as Charles Stuart Lyon concludes, "it seems fair to say that the evidence fits the conclu-
sions of Justice Black [majority] better than those of Justices Stone and Frankfurter
[minority] .... " Old Statutes and New Constitution, 44 COLUM. L. REy. 599. 607 (1944).
The device of tying a statute to a constitutional provision is not unique to the Sherman
Act. Indeed, similar issues have arisen in the interpretation of other federal statutes
when the constitutional provision to which they were tied expanded. See id. at 603-38.
Because the issue is one of congressional intent, decisions construing other such statutes
are of limited relevance. But in those cases where congressional intent is not dear,
precedents from other areas prior to the passage of the statute in question may be
important.
48. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1894). In United States v. Debs,
64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), the circuit court discussed pre.1890 Commerce Clause cases
and found that the commerce power in 1890 embraced "all instrumentalities and subjects
of transportation among the states .... " Id. at 751.
49. According to the Supreme Court in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), the restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause
around the time when the Act was passed, as represented by United States v. E. C. Knight,
156 U.S. 1 (1894),
The Yale Law Journal
Since the Sherman Act clearly is not confined by 1890 constructions
of the Commerce Clause, the "trade or commerce" limitation must
find other evidence of legislative intent to survive. The debates dis-
close no such evidence. On the contrary, the legislative history shows
that Congress meant to strike broadly at certain economic evils to the
full extent of its power. ° After an identical historical inquiry, the
Supreme Court in Atlantic Dyers & Cleaners concluded that Congress
did not intend "trade or commerce" in Section 3 of the Act to have
a restrictive meaning. 51 The Court stated:
A consideration of the history of the period immediately preceding
and accompanying the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and
of the mischief to be remedied, as well as the general trend of
debate in both Houses, sanctions the conclusion that Congress
meant to deal comprehensively and effectively with the evils re-
sulting from contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade and to that end exercised all the power it possessed.
2
IV. Policy
A. Strong Policy Underlying the Act
Sherman Act policy provides a powerful argument against the two
supposed limitations. 53 The Act's policy is to bar certain economic
evils, regardless of where they occur.
made the statute a dead letter for more tl.an a decade and, had its full force re-
mained unmodified, the Act today would be a weak instrument, as would also tile
power of Congress, to reach evils in all the vast operations of our gigantic national
industrial system antecedent to interstate sale and transportation of manufactured
products.
334 U.S. at 230.
50. Senator Edmunds, supra note 41, explained that the Act was drawn in the form
in which we know it because of a desire "to strike at these evils broadly." 21 CONG. REC.
3148 (1890). See 2 A. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS § 800 (1901) who concludes, "To
the extent of the power of Congress the Act is comprehensive." See also Searles, supra
note 43, at 141.
51. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers' reference to Justice Story's definition of the word
"trade" as used in The Coasting and Fisheries Act of 1793, 286 U.S. at 435.36, has been
misinterpreted by later courts as authoritatively defining the term "trade or commerce"
in the Sherman Act, see note 115 infra. In Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, as in United
States v. National Ass'n Real Estate Bds. where Story's definition was again referred to,
339 U.S. at 490-91, the reference was not made for the purpose of excluding certain activi.
ties from the reach of that term. Instead, reference was made in both cases in order to
show the inclusive breadth of the term "trade or commerce" which both cases found to be
inclusive of the activities there in issue. Neither case made any pretense of transplanting
Story's 1834 definition from an entirely alien context as an authoritative definition of
"trade or commerce" in the Sherman Act. Reliance on these references is approving
Story's definition for the purpose of excluding activities from the scope of the Act is
entirely unfounded.
52. 286 U.S. at 435 (emphasis supplied).
53. Courts have traditionally looked to the original congressional intent and the under-
lying policy to determine the Act's proper construction. This approach was originated
by Chief Justice White in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). He asserted
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In announcing the "traditionally non-commercial" limitation, the
Marjorie Webster court sought support in past Supreme Court de-
cisions for the contrary theory that the type of activity, rather potential
for economic evils, determines whether the Act applies. The court,
for example, quoted Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc. 4 saying that the Sherman Act restrictions were
"'tailored ... for the business world,' not for the non-commercial
aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions."53 But the court
failed to convey the Supreme Court's distinction between "political"
as opposed to "business" predation; the former was not actionable tin-
der the Act primarily because of the constitutional problems inherent
in interpreting the Act so as to interfere with freedom of speech and
the right to petition. Marjorie Webster similarly relied on language in
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader"' saying that the Act was aimed at "trusts"
and combinations with commercial objectives and not at organizations
like labor unions.57 But in view of subsequent congressional pronounce-
ments concerning labor's relation to the antitrust laws, the union
analogy has no real force.58 Marjorie Webster must depend upon the
belief that institutions of higher education somehow differ from the
late nineteenth century trusts.59 But the court in Marjorie Webster
that the Act should be construed in the "light of reason, guided by the principles of law
and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the statute . . . :
Id. at 64. In the same vein, Justice Day stated: "the courts should construe the law with
a view to effecting the object of its enactment." United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co..
226 U.S. 61, 87 (1912). See also United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371,
388 (1923).
54. 365 US. 127 (1961).
55. 432 F.2d at 654.
56. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
57. 432 F.2d at 654.
58. See Searles, supra note 41, at 145. In the labor-antitrust area, the courts have
been confronted with an entirely different problem: the necessity of rationalizing the in-
consistent policies of Congress' labor and antitrust laws. "The conflict between competition
and collective bargaining creates severe problems of statutory interpretation, as well as
critical issues of public policy." Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Ap-
plication of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 28 (1963). Thus, the
extent to which the Sherman Act is inapplicable to labor organizations is attributable
to subsequent legislation rather than to the original intent of the Congress which passed
the Sherman Act.
59. Quoting Apex Hosiery to the effect that, "The Act was a product of 'the era of
"trusts" and of "combinations" of businesses and of capital,'" the Court concluded that it
was aimed primarily at "combinations having commercial objectives." 432 F.2d at &54
(footnote omitted). In so doing, the Court seems to have confused the evils at which
the Act was aimed with the context in'which they arose in the years prior to 1890. The
evil at which the Act was aimed was not those particular "trusts" and "combinations"
themselves, but the harms which they perpetrated upon the public. In his comprehen-
sive treatise on the nature and effects of the trusts, TitE TRusr PRontas IN THE U rr
STATEs (1921), Eliot Jones concludes that the trusts injured the public by "charging
prices higher than the public would pay under competitive conditions." Id. at 282.
Senator Sherman's speeches in support of his bill bear this out. He stated, "I am not
opposed to combinations in and of themselves," 21 CoNC. REc. 2569 (1890) and sum-
marized:
It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of the common law and human
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made no finding that the economic evils at which the Act was aimed
are absent from the areas exempted by the limitation. The basis for
Marjorie Webster is, therefore, that Congress never intended the
Sherman Act to reach these economic evils when they occur in sectors
of the economy in which they did not exist in 1890.
Courts have traditionally interpreted the Sherman Act "in light of
its legislative history and of the particular evils" 0 at which it was
aimed. ;' A narrow view of these evils is given in Marjorie Webster.
But in Apex Hosiery-the very case on which Marjorie Webster relied
-the Supreme Court interpreted those evils more broadly. According
to the Court in Apex Hosiery, the Sherman Act was designed to strike
at the evil of "control of the market by suppression of competition in
the marketing of goods and services ... which tended to restrict pro-
duction, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment
of purchasers or consumers of goods and services."0 2 The Supreme
Court has consistently considered the evil in general economic terms.03
The Act maintains a free market by barring interference from accre-
experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination.
Id. at 2457. Sherman said his bill sought "only to prevent and control combinations made
with a view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to increase the profits
of the producer at the cost of the consumer." Id. Speaking of trusts, he said, "If they con-
ducted their business lawfully, without any attempt by these combinations to raise tile
price of an article consumed by the people of the United States, I would say let them
pursue that business." Id. at 2569.
Similar sentiments were expressed by others such as Senator Pugh, a member of the
Judiciary Committee, which prepared the Act in its present form. Senator Pugh said:
[T]he existence of trusts and combinations to limit the production of articles of
consumption entering into interstate and foreign commerce for the purpose of de-
stroying competition in production and thereby increasing prices to consumers has
become a matter of public history, and the magnitude and oppressive and merciless
character of the evils resulting directly to consumers and to our interstate and foreign
commerce from such organizations are known and admitted everywhere ....
Id. at 2558. Thus, Congress was not stirred merely by use of the "trust" form but by the
evils produced by the aggregations of economic power operating in that form.
60. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897),
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940). See also ICCAFFREY, supra note 36, at 63-64, 2 SuTHERLAND, supra note
36, at 482-84.
62. 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940). See J. CLARK, THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 25.38 (1904),
JONES, supra note 59, at 260-82 (1921). These economic evils will hereinafter be referred
to by the shorthand expression "anticompetitive" evils. This usage is only for the pur-
pose of convenience and is not intended to imply that the policy behind the Act re-
quires the universal imposition of atomistic competition.
63. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-52 (1911). Projection
of the evils in economic terms is consistent with the portrayal of those evils by the legis.
lators themselves throughout the debates. A "trust," as an aggregation of economic
power, is injurious to the public because, in the words of Senator Sherman, "it tends to
advance the price to the consumer of any article produced." 21 CoNc. REc. 2457 (1890).
Further describing the injurious effects, Senator Sherman observed:
The price to the consumer depends upon the supply which can be reduced at
pleasure by the combination. It will vary in time and place by the extent of com.
petition, and when that ceases it will depend upon the urgency of the demand for
the article. The aim is always for the highest price that will not check the demand,
and, for the most of the necessaries of life, that is perennial and perpetual.
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tion and exercise of market power on the theory that an open market
system will elicit products and services at the lowest prices.04 At the
same time, it assures those who produce goods or provide services of
an open market in which to freely compete.a The Supreme Court
reiterated the importance of this policy just this year:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental per-
sonal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert
with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever eco-
nomic muscle it can muster. 0
In recognition of this strong policy, the Supreme Court in general
has narrowly construed those exemptions that Congress has explicitly
granted.
67
The "trade or commerce" and "traditionally non-commercial" limi-
tations frustrate the Act's policy. While Congress intended the Act to
reach anticompetitive behavior no matter where it arises, these limi-
tations insulate certain economic sectors where anticompetitive poten-
tial exists.68 Although this jurisdictional inquiry need not decide the
merits of the underlying antitrust claim, the following examples il-
lustrate possible anticompetitive behavior which these limitations
would prevent the Act from reaching.
The so-called "learned professions"0 bristle with anticompetitive
Id. at 2460. See also id. at 2461, 2569. Similar statements by other legislators are numerous.
See, e.g., remarks of: Senator Pugh, id. at 2558; Senator Stewart, id. at 2643; Senator George
id. at 3147; Senator Edmunds, id. at 3148; Senator Teller, id. at 2571; Representatic
Heard, id. at 4101; Representative Culbertson, id. at 4089, 4090; Representative Wilson,
id. at 4096-97; Representative Fithian, id. at 4102.
64. See THoRn.LLt, supra note 36, at 227.
65. Id.
66. United States v. Topco Associations, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
67. See Pogue, supra note 11, at 327.
68. Regardless of the extent to which these broad and inexplicit limitations may
ultimately be narrowed, in their present state they may severely deter the bringing of
antitrust suits in the potentially insulated areas. The gauntlet run by the government
between 1939 and 1943 in the course of bringing the Sherman Act to bear upon the
American Medical Association's campaign to thwart the growth of the contract practice
of medicine is indicative of what a plaintiff must be prepared to endure in order to
apply the Sherman Act to activities potentially insulated by the limitations. See note 115
infra. In light of these costly hurdles and the Supreme Court's failure in American
Medical Ass'n to authoritatively define "trade or commerce," it is not unusual that the
issue of the applicability of the Act to such activities has been raised so rarely since
that time.
69. The "learned professions" appear to be exempt from the Act under both the
"trade or commerce," see note 5 supra, and the "traditionally non-commercial" limitation.
The latter limitation appears from Marjorie Webster to exempt the "learned professions"
because the Act was not aimed at "the non-commercial aspects of the liberal arts and
the learned professions." 432 F.2d at 654.
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potential. As the Martindale-Hub bell complaint alleges, the Law
Directory bases an attorney's rating upon solicited evaluations of his
competence by established attorneys in the same locality.10 This "rate-
yourself-and-your-competitors" system reflects the self-interest of es-
stablished attorneys by discriminating against "more capable young
lawyers" and attorneys "who practice personal injury law on the
plaintiff's side," and, as a result, it "stifle[s] competition." 7' Many
prestigious clients deal only with the highest rated lawyers, so that the
rating system allegedly injures those lawyers receiving bad ratings or,
worse still, those who receive no ratings at all.7 2 The Directory's rating
system arguably has served as a collusive mechanism allowing estab-
lished lawyers to develop and retain economic power in the market
for legal services by suppressing "competition among legal counsel,"
thereby depriving the plaintiffs and the public of the benefits of such
competition.7"
The facts as alleged in the Virginia State Bar suit illustrate the long-
recognized 74 anticompetitive potential of fixed minimum legal fee
schedules. Such schedules are adopted and circulated by the state and
local bar associations. According to a past president of a local associa-
tion, "If a lawyer consistently charges low (below the minimum fee
schedule), it's considered unethical, and he could be disbarred." 76
The complaint alleges that the fixed minimum fee schedules have in-
creased the cost of legal services to artificially high levels, by suppress-
ing competition in the market for legal services.70 Other equally chal-
lengeable restraints in the practice of law include rules against solicita-
70. Steingold v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., Civil Action No. 72-1460 (N.D. Cal., filed
Aug. 11, 1972), Complaint at 6.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id. Thus, the nominal plaintiff in Martindale-Hubbell claims that
on numerous occasions [he] has been denied law fees and forwarded cases because
lawyers in other areas read in defendant's professed objective "lawyer's guide" that
he was not rated and thus referred these cases to lawyers of lesser ability who are
part of the plan and conspiracy and who were "rated."
Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 9.
74. See, e.g., WINTERS, BAR ASSOCiATIO, ORGANIZATION AND AcrIVITIES 111 (195)
Brown, Some Observations on Legal Fees, 24 Sw. L.J. 565, 566 (1970); Coons, note 10
supra, at 753-54; Marcus, Civil Rights and the Antitrust Laws, 18 U. Cii. L. REV. 171,
192-93 (1950); Note, A Critical Analysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85
HARV. L. REv. 971 (1972); Note, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of
Antitrust, 1968 Wisc. L. REv. 1237. Cf. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate
Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950) (applying the Sherman Act to fixed minimum fees in the real
estate brokerage business).
75. Washington Post, Nov. 1, 1972, § A, at 12, col. 5.
76. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, Civil Action No. 75-72-A (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 20,
1972), Complaint at 8-9.
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tion,77 undue restriction of bar association membership, 8 and tie
mysteriously identical starting salaries offered by law firms in the
same locality.
7 9
In medicine, a similar potential for anticompetitive conduct exists.
Medical associations have prevented competition by opposing various
group health and prepaid insurance plans,80 restricting membership in
medical societies,8 ' precluding individual physicians from practicing
in certain locales,8 2 and allocating posts at medical institutions.8 3 Fur-
thermore, these associations have artificially curtailed the number of
doctors by imposing limits on the number of students accepted by
medical schools, 8 4 thus barring potential practitioners from entering
the field and drastically reducing consumer choices.
77. See Note, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, supra
note 74, at 1255-56; Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Professional Duty to Mahe
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
78. See Marcus, supra note 74, at 193-94.
Imagine that the largest law firms of a particular state, feeling the pressure of com-
petition from smaller firms and individual practitioners, meet and agree upon a plan
like Petitioners' [in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited 404 U.S.
508 (1972)]. They establish a joint trust fund fed by monthly contributions based
upon their respective gross billings to clients. The firms then send a circular to all
law schools in the nation announcing that they intend to oppose every applicant for
admission to the bar of that state before the bar examiners, the character and fitness
committees, and all reviewing courts, and that they intend to do so regardless of the
merits of any individual's case.
The plan would certainly deter young men and women from seeking to practice
law in that state.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, at 18-19, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.
404 U.S. 508 (1972).
79. Even where there is no evidence that law firms have colluded in fixing the salaries
they will offer to new associates, an agreement among them may possibly be inferred
from the bare fact of parallel action. According to the Supreme Court in Theatre Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), an agreement may
properly be inferred only if the individual decisions are interdependent, such that the
individual decisions can be explained by factors that are valid regardless of the actions
of the other members of the alleged group. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HArv. L. Rv.
655 (1972).
80. In American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), the Act was
applied to a similar factual situation because the plaintifrs activity extended be)ond the
traditional practice of medicine, see p. 315, and was held to be "trade or commerce."
But the same anticompetitive evils would have existed had the plaintiff only been
involved in the traditional practice of medicine. See also United States v. Oregon State
Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), where the Act was not applied because the requisite
effect on interstate commerce was not present. The anticompetitive nature and effect
of the established profession's opposition to group health and prepaid insurance plans
is widely recognized. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 74, at 195.98; Note, The American
Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J.
937, 977-78, 980-98 (1954).
81. See Marcus, supra note 74, at 197; Note, The American Medical Association: Power,
Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, supra note 80, at 950, 953.
82. See Marcus, supra note 74, at 198; Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v.
King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 626-27, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
83. See Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical SOcy. 39
Wash. 2d 586, 623-25, 664, 667, 669, 237 P.2d 737 (1951); Marcus, supra note 74. at 197-98.
84. See Note, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Or-
ganized Medicine, supra note 80, at 969-74.
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As for higher education and related activities, 0 the facts of Marjorie
Webster amply illustrate the problem. The district court in that case
found, as a matter of fact that the defendant, Middle States Association
refused to accredit Marjorie Webster Junior College on the sole
ground that it was an institution run for profit; the court found also
that this accrediting criterion was unrelated to the quality of education
providedA06 The Association injured Marjorie Webster by encouraging
potential students to attend instead junior colleges whose credits
could be transferred to four-year colleges.87 As a result, the Association
also injured students by arbitrarily reducing the number of accredited
junior colleges.
Anticompetitive evils in amateur athletics"8 have been dramatized
during the continuing dispute between the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association and the Amateur Athletic Union."" For example, the
NCAA forbids its member athletes from discussing, negotiating, or
signing professional contracts while still in college. In addition, each
organization bars its athletes from taking part in the other's compe-
tition.90 Such anticompetitive restrictions injure sports fan-consumers.91
They also injure amateur athletes by limiting their opportunities to
compete, gain exposure, and bargain for professional opportunities.
In terms of the Sherman Act's policy, these potentially anticompeti.
tive practices injure the consumer whose interest is at stake-the client,
patient, student, and sports fan-just as severely as the nineteenth cen-
85. See note 5 supra. The potential for the anticompetitive evils in education-related
activities like research, housing and food services is not diminished by the fact that
these activities are conducted on campus.
86. 302 F. Supp. 459, 467-68 (D.D.C. 1969).
87. Id. at 468.
88. Amateur athletics, whether conducted in or out of an educational milleu, appear
to be exempt under the "traditionally non-commercial" limitation. Also even under the
broadest definition which courts have attributed to "trade or commerce"-the one the
District Court in Marjorie Webster applied-that term would not include amateur ath-
letics. The Marjorie Webster definition was: "all occupations in which men are en.
gaged for a livelihood," 302 F. Supp. 459, 465.
89. See generally Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.,
356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966); People v. Santa Clara Valley Bowling Proprietors' Ass'n, 238
Cal. App. 2d 225 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Corn.
inerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 89-40 (1965); Note, The Government of Amateur A/is.
letics: The NCAA-AAU Dispute, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 464 (1968).
90. N'CAA by-laws 7(b) and (c) prevent student-athletes of member institutions from
competing in AAU sponsored track and field and gymnastic competitions. See NCAA, 1968
Manual 45-46. Similarly, AAU Rule l(2)(b) reciprocates. See OFFICIAL HANDBOOK OF 1IIt
AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION OF THE UNITED STATES 52 (1966).
91. On the basis of the consumer-oriented policy underlying the Act, amateur atl.
letics are in no way distinguishable from professional athletics to which the Act Is
applicable. See, e.g., United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc.;
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Deeson v. l'rofessional Golfers
Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 8'16 (1966); Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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tury "trusts" injured the consumer of their products. As Justice Mar-
shall said in Flood v. Kuhn,
The importance of the antitrust laws to every citizen must not be
minimized. They are as important to baseball players, lawyers,
doctors, or members of any other class of workers. 2
B. Institutional Considerations
Given the lack of support for limitations in judicial precedent and
congressional intent, additional considerations may be instrumental,
realistically speaking, in determining whether to apply the Sherman
Act to the legal profession and other activities.
1. Judicial Reluctance
Courts may sometimes be motivated to restrict the Act's reach by a
belief that the policy of the Act, however strong, is inappropriate for
ordering certain activities,03 and a fear of the inability of courts to
implement that policy in certain areas. The answer to the first mis-
giving lies in a long series of cases in which the Supreme Court defer-
ring to the authority and competence of Congress, has refused to grant
antitrust exemptions despite arguments that the antitrust laws are in-
appropriate for governing particular activities.0 4 Although the vague-
ness of the Sherman Act has given courts leeway in interpreting it,03
they have imposed self-restraint when asked to grant exemptions from
92. 407 U.S. 258, 292 (1972). Justice Marshall dissented out of disagreenent with the
Court on other issues.
Indeed, the importance of the strong policy behind the Act for all areas of economic
activity has long been recognized. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1943),
for example, the Supreme Court held that policy applicable to the dissemination of
news and implied that the policy was equally relevant to the activities of providing "food,
steel, aluminum, or anything else people need or want." Id. at 7.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1951); Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 274 (1972); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233.
236 (1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Levin v. Doctors Hosp.0 Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953. 934
(D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of
Hosps., 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also Note, The Medical Profession and the
Sherman Act, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1044 (1940). Cf. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1934).
94. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351-52 (1940); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1944); United States
v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 484, 489 (1950); United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371-72 (1963).
95. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940). In this regard, Senator
Sherman stated:
All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and we can be
assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law,
as the courts of England and the United States have done for centuries.
21 CONG. REc. 2460. See also Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,
9 J. LAw & Ecov. 7, 35 (1966).
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it.0 6 In view of the immense consequences of excluding any activity-
consequences to potential competitors and the entire consuming pub-
lic97-the decision to exempt is an appropriate one for the legislature,
a representative institution that is accountable to the public. Display-
ing the second misgiving, the court in Marjorie Webster was concerned
with its competence to determine issues such as whether the proprietary
character of a college is so related to its quality that the accrediting as-
sociation is justified in refusing to accredit profit-run institutions. 8
In some fields of law, courts normally defer to the good faith and
judgment of the specialized participants themselves;00 but the general
approach is to subject the facts to judicial scrutiny aided by expert
testimony, 00 especially where the cost of judicial reluctance is great,
as it is here. Although courts lack the expertise of some regulatory
agencies, the character of their inquiry in applying the Sherman Act
differs markedly from that of agencies applying regulatory statutes.
The Sherman Act is predicated on a laissez-faire theory and serves only
to impose outside limits on freedom of action. Indeed, in applying the
96. See, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561
(1944); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 (1954); United States v. International
Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1955); Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1956). Extrapolating from these cases, the likely reaction of
courts when asked to exempt professions such as law, an American Bar Foundation Re-
search Memorandum states,
[F]rom the point of view of antitrust doctrine the creation of such an exemption
[for professions] would be a gross form of judicial legislation which the recent
cases involving organized sports indicates [sic] the Court is loath to undertake.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 10.
97. When an exemption is granted, a valuable largess flows to the established par-
ticipants of the activity, at the expense of their competitors and the population gener-
ally. The established participants' freedom of action is no longer constrained by the
proscription of the Sherman Act. They are free to reap the economic rewards from aggre-
gation and exercise of economic power in the market. Recognizing this largess, Senator
Ervin stated, regarding a proposed exemption from the antitrust laws for professional
basketball to allow the leagues to merge, "the owners of professional basketball leagues
are asking for what, I believe, is the biggest financial giveaway in this country since the
SST was proposed." 117 CONG. REC. S15452 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1971).
98. The court's concern was expressed with regard to application of constitutional
limitations to the Association's refusal to accredit. Application of the Sherman Act
would have raised the same factual issue. The court stated:
[W]e believe that judicial review of appellant's standards should accord substantial
deference to appellant's judgment regarding the ends that it serves and the means
most appropriate to those ends.
432 F.2d at 657.
99. One such field is corporate dividend law. When confronted with minority share-
holder suits courts are reluctant to intervene unless there is clear evidence of bad faith
on the part of management in not declaring dividends. In such cases, management's
explanation of a plausible business reason for not declaring the dividends is generally
sufficient to satisfy the court. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919);
W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1575-88 (4th ed. 1969).
100. This approach has generally been taken in professional malpractice suits, whether
involving medicine, law, accounting, or education. See generally T. ROADY, JR. & W. AN-
DERSON, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (1960).
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Act to such specialized activities, trial courts have handled such critical
factual issues with relative ease.' 0 '
2. Protection of the Public Interest by Alternative Means
Another reason for exempting certain activities from the Act's reach
may be the theory that certain specialized participants are sufficiently
concerned with the high-quality of their service or product that they
may be relied upon to regulate themselves. But such a theory assumes
either that high quality of product and minimization of price are
always consistent with the economic self-interest of the specialist, or
that in case of conflict the specialist will unselfishly choose to serve the
public. This assumption is belied by experience; 102 it becomes all the
more suspect when the relationship between buyer and seller is no
longer a personal one, as is increasingly the case where lawyer and
client, doctor and patient, and educator and student are concerned.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,0 3 the Supreme Court faced
the issue of whether the existence of a pervasive self-regulatory scheme
over stock exchange activity preempted application of the Sherman
Act. The Court held that the Act applied, noting that there was noth-
ing built into the scheme of self-regulation "which performs the anti-
trust function of insuring that an exchange will not in some cases apply
its rules so as to do injury to competition which cannot be justified
as furthering legitimate self-regulative ends."'' 04 As a general rule,
"relief from antitrust standards and consequences is compensated for
by a substituted enforcement device providing some assurance that
the exemption will not be abused or that somehow the public interest
101. In American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 532-33 (1943), the
Supreme Court upheld that the Association's sanctions against doctors invohed in the
contract practice of medicine constituted a violation of the Act. In Deesen v. Professional
Golfers Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165, 169-72 (1966). cert. denied, 338 U.S. 846 (1966).
the court upheld the trial court finding that the 1PGA's rules governing the eligibilit) of
entrants into PGA sponsored tournaments were not in violation of the Act because they
were reasonably related to the objective of insuring "that professional golf tournaments
are not bogged down with great numbers of players of inferior ability," 358 F.2d at 170.
The trial court in Marjorie Webster, 302 F. Supp. 459 (1969), found that the Association's
denial of accreditation to Marjorie Webster solely because of the latter's proprietary
nature did constitute a violation of the Act, stating, "Defendant's assumption that the
profit motive is inconsistent with quality is not supported by the evidence," id. at 468.
The Court of Appeals reversed but on the grounds that the Act w'as not applicable,
not that it had been misapplied. See 432 F.2d 650 (1970).
102. Recognition of natural human greed has led courts to apply the Sherman Act
to trade and professional associations in other activities despite their reputedly bene-
ficial aims. See, e.g., Fashion Originators Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941);
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 349-61 (1963).
103. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
104. Id. at 358. See also Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-Commercial Concerted
Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247, 292.
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will be protected."'10 5 In the areas likely to be judicially exempted
under the "trade or commerce" and the "traditionally non-commer-
cial" limitations, there are no substitute enforcement devices. As the
Supreme Court in Silver realized, self-regulation is an inadequate
proxy to the Sherman Act for protection of the public interest.
3. Legislative Inaction
Still another reason for exempting certain activities from the Act
might be the belief that congressional inaction is a sign of approval of
the limitations applied so far. In Flood v. Kuhn, the Supreme Court
acknowledged Congress' responsibility for granting exemptions and
read congressional inaction as approval of the baseball exemption.100
Even if the Supreme Court was correct in the matter of the baseball
exemption, however, it is impossible to infer approval of the broad and
inarticulated "trade or commerce" and "traditionally non-commercial"
limitations from legislative inaction. The general rule, reiterated by
the Supreme Court in 1970,107 is that legislative inaction in no way
reflects congressional intent. 08 Congressional inaction regarding the
baseball exemption fell within a narrow exception to the rule provid-
ing that inaction may be read as intent where compelling circumstances
surround Congress' failure to act.10 9 As the Court in Flood recognized,
baseball had been the subject of two explicit Supreme Court decisions
and remedial legislation had repeatedly been before Congress. 110 In
105. Pogue, supra note 11, at 328.
106. 407 U.S. 258, 281, 283-84 (1972).
107. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970).
108. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1939); Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241-42
(1970); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 327 n.17 (1971); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79,
404 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1971).
109. The general rule, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets is quall.
fied by the proviso: "in the absence of any persuasive circumstances evidencing a clear
design that congressional inaction be taken as acceptance ...... 398 U.S. at 242. This
exception to the general rule has been recognized since the rule's inception. In
Halfock, the Court recognized that congressional inaction might be interpreted as
intent where there are "very persuasive circumstances enveloping congressional silence,"
309 U.S. at 119. The exception to the rule is explained by the rule's rationale. As
stated by the Court in Hallock, "Congress may not have had its attention directed to al
undesirable decision .... " 309 U.S. at 120. But where the circumstances make It clear
that Congress has considered the matter, approval is more reasonably inferred from
inaction.
110. The circumstances surrounding congressional inaction regarding baseball's ex-
emption fit well into this exception. According to the Court in Flood, "Legislative pro.
posals have been numerous and persistent. Since Toolson more than fifty bills have
been introduced in Congress relative to the applicability or nonapplicability of the
antitrust laws to baseball." 407 U.S. at 281. As Flood justifiably concludes, there has
been "full and continuing congressional awareness" of baseball's exemption. Such per-
suasive circumstances leave no room for the possibility that "Congress may not have had
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sharp contrast, the limitations at issue here remain unclarified by the
Supreme Court and, perhaps as a result, have never been the subject
of congressional proposals."' Thus, the situation here more closely
resembles what the Flood Court called "mere congressional silence and
passivity." 1 2 Since Congress has never exempted activities that are
not "trade or commerce" or that are "traditionally non-commercial,"
courts should apply the Sherman Act and allow Congress to decide
whether or not to exempt the activities, thus following the courts'
past pattern of dealing with supposed antitrust exemptions. 1 3
4. Principled Adjudication
A final reason for creating and perpetuating the limitations under
scrutiny here may be the courts' desire for flexibility in administering
the Act with regard to activities that ostensibly differ significantly in
economic characteristics. But these limitations preclude principled
adjudication, undermining the effort to articulate clear criteria for
administering the Act. Clear criteria are especially necessary because
of the Act's breadth and vagueness. 114 Courts have never authoritatively
defined "trade or commerce," or synthesized their holdings in a clear
doctrine. Faced with contradictory definitions of the concept, the Su-
preme Court has never settled the issue.'11
its attention directed" to the matter. Thus, the Court in Flood appropriately distin-
guished the circumstances of that case from those compelling application of the general
rule, which it characterized as "mere congressional silence and passivity," 407 U.S. at
283.
111. The circumstances surrounding congressional inaction in response to the "trade
or commerce" and "traditionally non-commercial" limitations call for appl)ing the
general rule that inaction should not be read as intent. There is strong basis for draw-
ing the same conclusion which the Court in Hailock drew-that "Congress may not
have had its attention directed to" the matter. In Girouard, there were three Supreme
Court decisions firmly establishing the rule at issue; in addition, there was one instance
of legislative action on the matter. However, the Court stated, "The silence of Con.
gress and its inaction are as consistent with a desire to leave the problem fluid as the)
are with an adoption by silence of the rule of those cases." 328 U.S. at 70. Certainly
here, where there is neither Supreme Court authority establishing the limitations nor
legislative recognition of them, the Court's remark is even more apposite.
112. 407 U.S. at 283 (1972).
113. See note 96 supra.
114. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 840 (1965).
115. Courts have based their holdings on theories unconnected with one another or
with any lasting principles emanating from the Sherman Act itself. One trial court
defined the term "trade or commerce" to mean all occupations except those in "the
liberal arts or learned professions." The court derived this definition from language in
an 1834 case construing the word "trade" in the Coasting and Fisheries Act of 1793.
United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 28 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D.D.C. 1939). The Court
of Appeals disagreed, offering another definition based on the activities to which the
doctrine of "restraint of trade" was applied at common law. United States v. American
Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The court did not use this defini-
tion to exclude activities from the Act but merely to show that the activity at issue
335
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The absence of such a definition may be explained by the absence
of policy: Courts have not determined the economic differences be-
tween the kinds of activities to which the Act should apply or not
apply. Without a policy articulating these differences, both the "trade
or commerce" and "traditionally non-commercial" limitations are
likely to remain subject to case-by-case determination, lacking gener-
ally applicable principles.
Conclusion
The supposed "trade or commerce" and "traditionally non-commer-
cial" limitations have no viability. The "trade or commerce" limitation
turns upon a mistaken reading of Federal Baseball, which led to an
unsupported and unsupportable presumption about legislative intent.
The "traditionally non-commercial" limitation, on the other hand, is
predicated on a misinterpretation of the policy behind the Sherman
Act. Indeed, both limitations frustrate the true policy of the Act. In
contrast to baseball's exemption, which has achieved a unique status
separate from the "trade or commerce" limitation, neither limitation
is supported by the grounds recently given by the Court for that ex-
emption: congressional inaction and stare decisis.116
was clearly within the reach of the Act. It should be noted that the court's method of
defining the term "trade or commerce," if used to exclude activities from the purview
of the Act, would be as fallacious as Marjorie Webster's technique of defining the
reach of the Act in terms of the activities in which the 19th Century trusts flourished.
See pp. 325-26. Both techniques confuse the context in which the evils have arisen in tile
past with the evils themselves.
The Supreme Court has adopted neither of these definitions, and has provided no clue
as to how to distinguish those activities which are not "trade or commerce." The Issue
was originally presented for scrutiny by the Supreme Court in 1940 when the defendants
sought certiorari from the Court of Appeal reversal of the District Court's dismissal
of the action. On this occasion the Supreme Court denied certiorari. American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 310 U.S. 644 (1939). The case then went back to the District
Court for trial which resulted in the conviction of the American Medical Association.
Appeal from the District Court's judgment based upon the conviction was taken to
the Court of Appeals, American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir.
1942). The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court this time granted certio.
rari in part. However, the Court avoided the necessity of providing an authoritative
definition of "trade or commerce," deciding the case on other grounds. American Medi-
cal Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). See p. 315 supra. In United States v.
National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 489 (1950), the Supreme Court held tile
business of real estate brokerage to be "trade or commerce," anti the Court's failure
to articulate specific criteria for defining the phrase provoked a fiery dissent from
Justice Jackson, who stated "[i]f real estate brokerage is to be distinguished from other
professions ... the Court does not impart standards for so doing." Id. at 496,
116. The "trade or commerce" and "traditionally non-commercial" limitations call.
not rely on either of the grounds which have supplanted the intent of the 51st Con-
gress as foundations for the baseball exemption. As has been shown, congressional
approval of these broad and inarticulated limitations cannot be inferred from con.
gressional inaction. See pp. 334-35. Similarly, exemptions for other activities cannot be
justified on grounds of stare decisis. The Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue
so as to provide any basis for detrimental reliance.
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The threshold question of the Act's applicability, of course, differs
from the ultimate question of substantive legality under the Act. In
both the Martindale-Hub bell and Virginia Bar Ass'n suits, courts
might find reasons for not proscribing the practices under attack. But
no reasons exist for denying jurisdiction.11 On finding that these ac-
tivities bear the necessary relationship to interstate commerce,118 courts
should proceed to consider whether the facts show substantive viola-
tions. The reasons, if any, for not proscribing those practices may then
be subjected to scrutiny by the legislature and by other courts.
117. It should be noted that there are a number of exemptions resulting from con-
gressional action subsequent to passage of the Sherman Act. See generaly' Pogue, supra
note 11; Antitrust Exemptions, 33 A.B.A. ATrrraus-r L.J. 1 (1967). However, these ex-
emptions do not cover the activities generally thought to be exempted under the
"trade or commerce" and "traditionally non-commercial" limitations. There is. how-
ever, another judicially created exemption which, if broadly construed, might exclude
some of the activities at issue in the virginia Bar Assn suit. See A. tERmcA, BAr Foux-
DATrIOx, supra note 11, at 9. This exemption was originated by Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943). and covers some state-approved transactions. See Pogue, supra note 11,
at 354; Bachelder, State-Approved Transactions, 33 A.B.A. ATrrrasr L.J. 99 (1967). In
Parker, the Supreme Court read the constitutional grant of power to state government
to restrict the power of Congress to "suspend state laws" without unequivocally an-
nouncing its intention to do so. In light of the general trend to grant exemptions only
where there is an alternative means for protecting the public interest, see p. 333, it is
likely that this exemption will ultimately be restricted so as to exempt only those
activities where the state regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to guard against
abuse of the exempt status. See generally Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anti.
competitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTrrausr L.J. 950 (1970).
118. It appears likely that almost all professional activities today would be con-
sidered to have sufficient impact upon interstate commerce for this power requisite
to be met. See Marcus, supra note 74, at 192. According to Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 227-35 (1948), the fact that the actiity
occurs entirely within one state does not necessarily negate the justification for exercis.
ing federal power. The proper inquiry is "whether effects forbidden by the antitrust laws
reach from processes occurring within to those occurring without the state." and the
effect of subsequent caselaw has been to extend the commerce power when appl)ing
the Act. Kallis, supra note 25, at 243, 248-51. But see United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218 (1947). It is likely that the practice of law in general would be considered
to have sufficient effect on interstate commerce. See Arnold & Corley, Fee Schedules Should
be Abolished, 57 A.BA.J. 655, 661 (1971). But see United States v. South-Eastent Under-
writers Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 573 (1944), where Justice Stone in dissent seemingly approved
the dictum in Federal Baseball saying that the practice of law is not interstate com-
merce and is not made so by ancillary interstate travel. As for fixed minimum fee
schedules particularly, see Note, The Wisconsin Afininuin Fee Schedule: A Problem of
Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L. RLv. 1237, 1246-47. But see AMiERicAN BAR FosToriox, supra
note 11, at 11. The practice of medicine is also likely to be regarded as having sufficient
impact on interstate commerce. See Arnold & Corley, supra, at 661. But see United
States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); Note, The ll'isconsin Minimum
Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, supra at 1245 n.54 (listing other medical cases
finding no interstate commerce).
